In GPS Denial: Addressing the Jamming & Spoofing Challenge

If you think of GPS interference as a cautionary tale, it's time to think again. Jamming and spoofing incidents are now daily occurrences in commercial aviation, affecting more than 1,500 flights a day and posing direct threats to flight safety and operational efficiency. 

No one is immune to jamming and spoofing. In late August, an aircraft carrying European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen experienced GPS signal disruption during approach to Plovdiv, Bulgaria, forcing the crew to revert to paper charts and ground-based navigation aids to land safely. EU and Bulgarian officials suspect Russian interference.

This episode reinforces that GPS denial is a clear and present threat that regulators, operators and avionics innovators – like Honeywell – need to address jointly.

Honeywell pioneered inertial navigation technologies in the 1970s, developing systems that provided position, velocity, and attitude information long before GPS became operational. Our Inertial Reference System (IRS) flies today on thousands of commercial aircraft, providing navigational continuity when GPS signals are unavailable. 

What are Jamming & Spoofing?

 “Jamming” is the deliberate transmission of radio signals to disrupt GPS signals, which are the primary source of navigation and timing data used by modern aircraft. Jamming can block, erase or distort critical information, disrupting the efficient operation of key onboard navigation, safety and surveillance technologies.

 “Spoofing” involves sending counterfeit signals to falsely alter an aircraft’s displayed position or change timestamps used by communications and surveillance systems. Because spoofed signals often appear valid, they can deceive onboard systems into believing the aircraft is a few yards or even tens of miles away from its actual location. This false information can cause misrouting, degraded separation, go-arounds or diversions.

How Do Commercial Systems Get Disrupted?

Most jamming and spoofing incidents originate when military forces try to deny or deceive enemy sensors in contested areas. The Black Sea and Crimea, the Baltic states and Eastern Europe, the Persian Gulf and Middle East and the South China Sea have seen repeated incidents in recent years.

Commercial aircraft are seldom the primary target of military jammers and spoofers; however, RF technology cannot distinguish between friend and foe or military and civilian aircraft, so GPS interference silently degrades navigation, surveillance and timing readings for any aircraft within range. 

The growing availability of powerful, low-cost RF gear to state and non-state actors means interference now occurs more often and with less discrimination than in the past. Sometimes, civil aviation is the target as malicious actors attempt to disrupt operations or make a political statement.

What is Honeywell Working On?

On behalf of Honeywell, I attended a recent workshop on Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) resilience hosted by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the International Air Transport Association (IATA). The event attracted a diverse group of aircraft manufacturers, operators, regulators and other experts with an interest in GPS interference. 

Attendees rallied around a short list of high-impact near-term and longer-term steps to improve resilience against jamming and spoofing: 

✓ Electronic Flight Bag Applications: Build apps for the cockpit that display real-time GPS interference “hotspots” using Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS-B) Out.

✓ Spoofing detection: Implement spoofing detection capability in aircraft systems (IRS, GNSS receivers), which can be used for crew alerting and systems resilience.

✓ Hybrid GPS and Inertial Navigation for ADS-B: Feed ADS-B Out information with a GPS/INS blended position, ensuring the aircraft's reported positions remain reliable even when GPS degrades.

✓ Use Existing Onboard and Ground Aids: Leverage IRS and Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) and consider regulatory changes that would enable Required Navigation Performance (RNP) operations in terminal areas based on multi-sensor navigation when GPS is unavailable.

✓Multi-Constellation, Dual-Frequency Receivers with Authentication: Develop receivers that use multiple satellite systems and two frequency bands and can support authentication.

✓ Space-Based Alternative PNT and EU Space Investments: Plan for longer-term (post-2030) European program investments to strengthen Galileo authentication, add Low-Earth-Orbit (LEO) positioning/timing services and improve precise timing infrastructure.

✓ Controlled Reception Pattern Antennas (CRPAs): Develop and standardize smart antennas that can detect and reject jamming.

✓ Alternative Navigation/Timing Options: Explore complementary technologies such as stellar navigation and LEO-based timing/position services to reduce sole reliance on the GPS constellation.